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Abstract: In this study, the authors examine the governance system of industrial
policy in the era of economic growth in Korea from the perspective of state-
society relations. Specifically, we consider the public and private actors who
engaged in governance processes related to industrial policy and their interactions,
as well as the formal and informal institutions that constrained the actors. As a
principal actor, the government established the effective and efficient institutions
in each stage of the governance process. These institutions not only enhanced the
industrial policy capacity of the government but also created an environment that
permitted various stakeholders in private sector to be involved in the governance
system. The private actors in the governance process, in turn, became major
sources of information and driving forces of industrial promotion.
Keywords: governance, industrial policy, institutions, state-society relations,
economic development in Korea
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that Korea has recorded rapid economic growth rates over the past
five decades. Per capita GNP increased from less than US$100 in 1960 to more than
US$ 20,000 in 2010. As Westphal (1990, p. 41), among many other development
economists, noted, this growth was accompanied by industrial policies actively intro-
duced by the government: “Korea’s government has selectively intervened to affect
the allocation of resources among industrial activities.” The government selected
industries that could have export competiveness at each development stage—the
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labor-intensive light industry in 1960s, the heavy and chemical industry in 1970s, and
the information technology industry since the latter half of the 1980s.
There have been a number of studies that have sought to account for Korea’s 
extraordinary success, which has led to a reasonably good understanding of the role
that government institutions played in helping or impeding economic development.
Korea’s success has been explained by reference to both neoclassical institutional 
theory that emphasizes the role of institutions that might be considered as prior to and
conditioning individual behavior and developmental state theory, a term used by interna-
tional political economy scholars to refer to the phenomenon of state-led development
in East Asia.
In spite of the contributions of previous research based on developmental state 
theory, we still do not have sufficient answers to following questions about the industrial
promotion in Korea. How does the government build coalitions and align a diverse
group of stakeholders consisting of government officials, businessmen, bureaucrats,
academics, and so forth with its policies? How do government officials maintain their
ties with influential members of the private sector? How has the government informally
settled disputes that have arisen with within governmental organizations or between
government officials and members of the private sector? What types of credible com-
mitment mechanisms have governments employed to elicit the trust of the diverse
stakeholders?
To fill in the gaps regarding the interactions between the government and private
stakeholders and to enhance our understanding of the changes and continuities in indus-
trial promotion in the era of economic growth in Korea, this study aims to analyze the
governance systems of industrial policy, emphasizing the institutional arrangements
and participation of various actors. More specifically, this study analyzes the governance
systems from the perspective of state-society relations with exploring formal and
informal institutions of the state, public and private actors in the institutions, and their
interactions in the governance process.
The authors examined a wealth of archival data, including white papers, newspaper
articles, academic papers, and testimonies, as well as policy reports published by execu-
tive agencies, the National Assembly, and research institutes analyzing them themati-
cally in an effort to develop a systematic understanding of actors and the constraints
that the institutional arrangements of the governance process for industrial promotion
places on them. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical
basis of this research is presented in section 2. The analysis of the governance system
of industrial promotion and its characteristics are discussed in section 3. Finally, the
implications for other developing countries are suggested as concluding remarks in
section 4.
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THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNANCE
Governance from the Perspective of State and Society Relations
Understanding governance is essentially a matter of understanding the nature of
state-society relations in the pursuit of collective interests. It is clear that both the state
and society participate in governance, although the degree of their involvement will
not be uniform across nations or policy fields (Pierre & Peters, 2005, p. 6). For example,
the role of networks and other societal actors in governance still depends on their
capacity to enforce decisions, necessarily implicating the power of the public sector
and its legitimate authority. On the other hand, the use of the private sector is often 
a means through which the public sector is able to legitimate as well as enhance the
efficiency and effectiveness of its actions (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009, pp. 6-10).
What, then, is “governance”? From the perspective of state-society relations, 
governance refers to tools, strategies, procedures, and administrative processing 
mechanisms that determine how power is executed, how people’s opinions are 
presented, and how decisions are made regarding matters of public interest (Pierre &
Peters, 2005, p. 2; Lynn et al., 2001, p. 7). It is generally believed that a state-society
relations approach in research on governance is more relevant to the study of economic
development and industrial policy than other approaches. This is because actors from
both the state and society take part in developmental projects and interact through
rational discussions, persuasion, and coordination of policy processes. Therefore, it
has been argued that development programs based on a synthesis of state-, market-,
and civil society-centered paradigms should be created to enhance the effectiveness of
developmental programs in underdeveloped countries (Kwon, 2010; Evans, 1997).
Building Blocks of Governance
Actors and Institutions
An analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved 
in governance. They participate in the decision-making and implementation processes
at various levels. All actors involved in governance, regardless of whether they belong
to the state or society, are interconnected and interact with other, negotiating and 
compromising, exchanging information and making political agreements, and leading
and following. Government can be conceptualized as one of the participants in the
governance system (Pierre & Peters, 2005, pp. 13-14; Stoker, 1998; Rhodes, 1996).
However, these actors are constrained by formal and informal institutions. In fact, a
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government is commonly divided into numerous departments and various levels of
administration, even though some research has treated the government as a unitary entity.
Such divisions in the government can be an obstacle to the achievement of collective
goals. Therefore, as a response to this problem, the government often establishes 
institutional standards within and across levels of the government (Timmermans,
2001; Weaver & Rockman, 1993, pp. 10-11).
Just as the state is a differentiated actor, so too is society. In rural areas, for example,
influential landlords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, and formal
and informal leaders of villages all participate in governance. On the one hand, these
social actors may have interests that compete with one another. On the other hand,
they act under various social structures that specify how they may operate and the
manner in which they may make decisions on their own or participate in collective
decision making. Such social structures and mechanisms that promote decision making
related to securing collective goals can affect the overall capacity of governance (Bell
& Hindmoor, 2009, p. 110; Pierre & Peters, 2005, p. 13). Thus, we should pay attention
to the social contexts within which they forge agreements regarding collective goals
and the mechanisms through which they participate in decision-making processes.
Process
In the pursuit of serving public interests, the actors involved in governance carry
out certain functions and interact with one another. From the viewpoint of governance
process, these functions include goal-selection, decision-making, resource-mobilization,
instruments and implementation, and provision of feedback (Pierre & Peters, 2005, pp.
14-16). First, “goal-selection” involves identifying the collective goals of society, and
“decision-making” involves determining how to attain the goals that have been estab-
lished. Both are extremely crucial and constitute the first part of the governance process.
Second, “resource-mobilization” refers to the need to identify and mobilize public and
private resources that can be used to reach the goals. Among these are financial as
well as personnel and legitimacy resources. Third, “instruments and implementation”
is the stage at which the goals and the intended effects are realized. For these functions
to be carried out successfully, effective instruments and strategies should be adopted.
Fourth, “provision of feedback” consists of a series of actions including evaluating
instruments used in the past and feeding the information from that evaluation back
into the decision-making process. In this way, the governance system is continually
adjusted by means of information exchanges and political agreements.
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Outcomes
Whereas the principal concern of the government is the formation of policy, the
primary concern of governance is the outcomes of the process. A specific policy or
program yields results in the form of outcomes that can be quantified, for example, as
economic growth rate, crime rate, or educational standards (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009,
p. 110). Additionally, some scholars consider broader characteristics of the policies
adopted or more comprehensive sets of outcomes as outcomes of governance. For
example, Pierre and Peters (2005, pp. 16-17) present the overall characteristics of 
governance, including coherence, inclusiveness, adaptability, and accountability, 
as outcomes of governance. Following this viewpoint, the characteristics of good 
governance can be formulated as outcomes such as participation, transparency, respon-
siveness, consensus orientation, effectiveness, and efficiency (UNESCAP, 2007; ODI,
2006).
Models of Governance
From the perspective of state-society relations, there are five fundamental models
of governance that developed and developing countries have adopted (Pierre & Peters,
2005, pp. 11-12). First is the étatiste model. In this model, the principal actor for all
aspects of governance is a government that possesses the capacity to govern and control
the manner in which social actors are permitted to participate in the governing process,
if they are at all. Second is the liberal-democratic model. Here the state is the principal
actor in governance, and other actors compete with other each in an effort to influence
the state. The state has the opportunity to pick and choose the interest groups or other
social actors that it will permit to have influence. Third is the state-centric model. In
this model, the state remains at the center of the process but institutionalizes its 
relationship with social actors. The state has substantial power to accept or reject 
partners but is more bound to its partners. One example of this model is corporatism.
Fourth is the Dutch governance school model, which has mainly been developed by
Dutch scholars drawing on the circumstances of Dutch politics. This model is heavily
dependent on the role of social networks in governing, with the state being merely one
among many actors. In this model, society is the more powerful actor, given its capacity
to organize itself to evade the power of the state and its attempts at regulation. Fifth is
the governance without government model. In this model, the state has lost its capacity
to govern and has become an arena in which private interests create more or less self-
steering governance arrangements that satisfy their own needs and desires. The 
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concrete characteristics of the models in terms of the building blocks of governance
are summarized in table 1.
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Table 1. Characteristics of Governance Models
Governance Models Actors Process Outcomes
– goal selection – cohesiveness
– decision making – inclusiveness
– resource mobilization – adaptability
– implementation – accountability
– feedback
étatiste model state as a – goal selection is state – not highly cohesive, as 
principal actor dominated turf wars within the state 
for all aspects – decision making is are typical
of governance technocratic – not inclusive, but the 
– resources are mobilized state does strategically 
by the state, which serves allow certain segments 
as both entrepreneur and of society to have an 
taxman influence
– implementation is – adaptability is limited
accomplished via coercive – accountability is 
instruments accomplished internally
– the state tends to be little 
concerned with role and 
utility of feedback from 
society
liberal-democratic – state – goal selection is a more – there is a trade-off 
model organizations competitive process than between cohesiveness 
or institutions with the étatiste model and the desire to secure 
– societal and bureaucratic politics political consent
interests – decision making is a – oligopolistic
symbiotic process between – adaptability is limited by 
state and social interests the absence of any 
– beneficiaries of policies consensus about form 
are burdened with adaptation should take
mobilizing resources – multiple channels of 
– implementation is the accountability
least coercive of the five 
models; it is carried out 
by third-parties and is 
self-regulatory
– feedback is incomplete 
and biased 
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Governance Models Actors Process Outcomes
state-centric model state and – state plays a primary role – high level of coherence
peak societal in goal selection – can be very inclusive but 
organizations – diverse forms of decision is selective and indirect 
making are adopted in at other times
accordance with the various – better at distributing 
types of corporatism gains but worse at 
– resource mobilization is distributing losses
distributive – actors who should be 
– implementation is held accountable are not 
interactive and negotiated the actors who in fact 
between state and society are
– feedback is better than in 
other models but still 
biased
Dutch governance networks of – goal selection is the state’s – problematic because of 
school model diverse and primary responsibility heterogeneity and 
socially – decision-making processes diversity of the actors
significant are not very formalized – high degree of 
actors – both state and society inclusiveness
have a strong capacity for – high level of adaptability 
mobilizing resources by ad-hoc, matrix-type 
– implementation is task forces
cooperative and self- – driven to an increasing 
regulating extent by performance 
– feedback is not as management and other 
efficacious as typically institutionalized means
assumed
governance without interorganizational, – goal selection is – cohesive within the 
government model self-governing determined more by what network but not across 
networks and is in the interests of the sectors
key participants network participants than – not inclusive because of 
in these by the state limitations of access to 
networks – decision making is the network
consensual – adaptability at the level 
– resources are mobilized of state can be impaired 
from the state by networks
– effective in implementing – confused and limited
the network participants’ 
goals but obstructive to 
government policy
– feedback is likely to be 
biased in favor of the 
interests of the network
Source: Adapted from Pierre & Peters 2005, pp. 17-45.
In the following section, we first examine the governance process of industrial 
policy during the heyday of Korea’s economic growth in terms of the broad features
outlined by Pierre & Peters (2005) model of governance and consider the major tasks
and functions of each stage of the process. Second, we examine the institutional
arrangements that were made for satisfying each stage of the governance process and
for promoting and constraining the actors who participated in the formulation and
implementation of industrial policy. Third, we identify the major actors and analyze
their interactions in each stage of the governance process.
ANALYSIS: THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
OF INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION
Goal Selection
In 1961, General Park Chung-hee staged a coup. The military junta declared that
economic development would be the top priority. He was aware that a self-sustaining
economy was needed to realize a “true liberal democracy” (C. Park, 1962). On July
22, 1961, the military junta established the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and on
July 31, it announced the comprehensive economic reconstruction plan. This plan was
developed by the civilian advisors to the Economic Reconstruction Planning Committee,
based on the plans of the previous government and strategized on ways to improve the
international balance of payments and to achieve a high growth rate by mobilizing
national resources.
This framework was maintained until the fourth five-year plan, even though the
tools, resources, and objects of industrial policy changed in accordance with the evolution
of the industrial structure. For example, one of the second plan’s “basic goals” was “to
promote establishment of a self-sustaining economy” (EPB, 1966), and one of the
third plan’s “basic plans” was “to establish a self-sustaining economy” (EPB, 1971),
while one of the fourth plan’s “basic goals” was “to establish a self-sustaining growth
structure” (EPB, 1976).
Institutions
The EPB in charge of the plan adopted the functions of budget compilation and 
statistics from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Home Affairs and introduced
the functions of technical management and foreign capital management. In 1964, the
EPB was authorized to head up economic policy making, after the minister of the EPB
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was given the position of deputy prime minister.
The plans were drafted from the subplans of practical planning groups. The EPB
supplied guidelines, and the ministry that was responsible for implementing each plan
led the group. Its bureaucrat became the head of the group, while an official of the
EPB took on the role of the coordinator. The group itself was made up of bureaucrats
from relevant ministries, professors, experts of public or private organizations and so
forth. The group provided a kind of forum for designing feasible goals.
Additionally, the EPB drew up a yearly plan to implement the long-range plan. The
yearly plan specified a target growth rate, GNP, inflation rate, amounts of imports and
exports, and so forth. The various ministries that had their particular constituencies
and points of view collaborated to set the numerical target of these macro indexes. For
example, the EPB negotiated the wage increase rate with the Ministry of Labor, the
currency rate with the Ministry of Finance, and export target figures with the Ministry
of Commerce and Industry (MCI).
Roles of Actors
The first plan, which was formulated in the absence of necessary information, insti-
tutions and collaborations, was just a list of construction plans for major factories
(interview with former Vice Minister Gyung-shik Lee, cited in Kang et al., 2008, p. 291).
Even though the second plan was drawn up by seven practical planning groups and
benefited from the advice of U.S. specialists, such as the Nathan Advisory Group and
Edward Shaw (Cole & Nam, 1969, pp. 13-14; Kang et al, 2008, p. 329), the plan-making
process was not systematic. The process depended on one individual, Hak-ryul Kim, who
was the vice minister of the EPB. The plan-making process became better organized
when the EPB prepared the third plan with input from bureaucrats, professors, and
experts.
There were a total of 22 practical planning groups for the fourth plan: four for 
the divisional plan of the EPB and the rest for the divisional plans of the MCI, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Construction, the Economic Science Council, the
Ministry of Agriculture-Forestry-Fisheries, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the
Korean Development Institute, among others. A bureaucrat of the ministry in charge
of the divisional plan led the group, and an official of the EPB was the coordinator 
as shown in table 2. About half of the members were bureaucrats from the MCI, the
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Construction rather than members of the
EPB. Experts from public institutions like the Bank of Korea and Research Institute of
Science and Technology accounted for 33.2%. The percentage of civilians, who were
mostly professors and experts from industrial associations, was 15.7%.
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For example, the MCI in charge of the heavy-chemical-industry plan managed a
practical planning group that many civilian experts participated in, as shown in table 3.
The assistant vice minister of heavy industry from the MCI led the group, and a
bureaucrat from the Investment Department of the EPB was the coordinator. Other
members included bureaucrats from relevant ministries and civilian experts.
There were many civilian participants, along with bureaucrats from relative min-
istries, who together constituted a kind of forum of equal members that cooperatively
formulated goals, elaborating common interests by respecting each other’s interests.
10 The Governance System of Industrial Policy
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Table 2. Composition of the Practical Planning Groups (Plan 4)
Category No. of Members Percentage Notes
government 146 51.0% MCI (20), Ministry of Finance (16), Ministry of Construction (13), EPB (10), etc.
Korean Development Institute (29), 
public institutions 95 33.2% Bank of Korea (14), Research Institute of 
Science and Technology (13), etc.
civilians 45 15.7% universities (28), corporations / associations (17)
Source: EPB 1975.
Table 3. Practical Planning Group for Heavy Industry (Plan 4)
Supervisory Head Coordinator Members (21)Ministry
MCI (directors for industrial planning, heavy 
industry, mechanical industry, and chemical 
industry), Ministry of Finance (director for financial
systems and section chief for tariff systems), 
Ministry of Construction (director of industrial 
sites), the Office of Science and Technology 
MCI (director of human resources planning), the heavy
(assistant vice EPB and chemical planning group (senior officer for MCI minister of (Investment planning), researchers from the Korean 
heavy industry) Department) Development Institute and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (2), and experts from 
the Industrial Bank, the Federation of Korean 
Industries, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, the Korea Association of Machinery 
Industry, the Precision Instrument Center, the 
Korea Maritime Research Institute, and the Korea
Industrial Development Institute
Source: EPB 1975.
The government listened to the voices of businesspeople and sought to establish policies
that would provide the highest benefits for them (Sagong & Johnson, 1981, pp. 98-
99).1 In addition, the goals of the government and the benefits to businesses were 
synchronized during the process of drawing up the plan (S. Choi, 2008). In other
words, the process of elaborating goals for industrial promotion was a process of
adjustment between the mutual interests of the government and businesses.2
Decision Making
Although the first plan was imperative, it had limitations due to the lack of
resources, and the plan was eventually revised in 1964. This experience caused the
subsequent plans to become indicative gradually since the second plan. The second
plan set macroscopic goals, and the microscopic decisions for achieving these goals
were decided in multiple levels of meetings that President Park or high-ranking
bureaucrats presided over. Table 4 shows the agendas of the monthly enlarged meeting
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Table 4. Agendas of the Enlarged Meeting for the Exported Promotion (1966-1980)
Agendas Total Number of Agendas
1. export promotion policies 96
2. strategies for export items 48
3. overseas market information and market exploitation updates 37
4. specific export strategies 28
5. setting and adjusting target number of items to be exported 18
6. reports on saemaeul (new village movement) factories 13
7. improvement of export goods 8
8. results of trade talks with foreign countries 6
Source: D. Choi 1991, p. 108.
1. Regarding the relationship between government and business, a businessman at the time
offered following testimony: “Bureaucrats and businessmen were very similar in age,
thought, sense of duty, etc. We shared a willingness to negotiate to achieve our goals. . . .
So, the relationship should not be considered as collusive or corrupt one. . . . I believe there
were common interests in sharing and pursuing goals in the 1960s” (interview with H com-
pany former employee, Mr. K, September 1996, cited in Ha, 2006, 147).
2. Testimony offered by Kang Gyung-shik describes the process as follows: “I believe the
five-year plans were ‘flags.’ In other words, making the plans was a symbolic action that
showed the willingness of the president to put the economy at the top of the list. . . . In this
regard, the planning process was greatly important. The planning process was an agree-
ment-making process that set economic development as the top priority (Kang Gyung-shik,
cited in Kang et al., 2008, 78-79).
for export promotion, which was a distinguished monthly meeting presided over by the
president. The core decisions for export-oriented industrialization were made during
the enlarged meeting. These decisions were formalized in acts, measures, or industrial
plans.
Institutions
Decision making took place in multiple organizations. Decisions were made in a
meeting of vice ministers, which was held in preparation of cabinet meetings. Because
the cabinet meeting was the last step in the decision-making process in the executive
branch, decisions about what items the cabinet should deliberate on were often made
in advance, at the vice ministers’ meeting (J. Jung, 1994, p. 45).
Decisions were also made at meetings of the economic ministers and the economic
ministers’ talk. The economic ministers began holding formal twice-weekly meetings
in 1964 (J. Jung, 1994, p. 51; D. Choi, 1991, pp. 63-64). The EPB adjudicated the
decision-making process. For instance, a proposal that an official of the EPB received
from another ministry would be circulated among the officials of the EPB. If there
were differences of opinion among them, the differences would be addressed before the
proposal was put on the agenda (D. Choi, 1991, pp. 63-64). The economic ministers’
talk was less regulated than the meeting of the economic ministers by the bureaucratic
hierarchy. Its agendas, the date of its meetings, and even its members were not fixed.
If an important agenda item came up, the secretary to the president for economic policy
could join in. The way that the talk was set enabled quick and flexible decision making
(D. Choi, 1991, pp. 66-67).
Two major economic ministries, the EPB and the MCI, likewise conducted a
monthly meeting that the president presided over. The monthly economic issues briefing
meeting was hosted by the EPB, and the president always participated in them. The
president was briefed on economic issues and then posed questions. In the meeting,
the various participants shared information about the status of the issues, the measures
that might be taken to address the issues and the obstacles in the way of resolving
them, and bench-marking cases that might be referred in the course of carrying out the
programs. The meetings became an institutional framework, with the EPB leading
economic policies. At the same time, the MCI provided another institutional frame-
work. It hosted the monthly enlarged meeting for export promotion, which was also
presided over by the president. It was held almost every month after 1965, and President
Park attended most of them (S. Choi, 2010b). At these meetings, the results of previous
meetings and progress of the ongoing plans were reported and analyzed, and solutions
for removing obstacles that were hindering exports were discussed.
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Some decisions were made in the president’s secretary office. Jung-ryum Kim, the
chief secretary in the Park administration, strengthened the capabilities of the office by
expanding economic organizations in the Blue House. For example, in 1971, another
senior secretary office was established to manage particular economic affairs such as the
defense industry and heavy and chemical industrialization. The assistant vice minister of
the MCI, Won-chul Oh, who proposed the policy change from light industry to heavy
and chemical industry, was appointed as the senior secretary of this new office, and
five elite bureaucrats of the MCI were recruited. The office occasionally regulated 
relevant ministries by organizing and managing temporary bodies. For example, the
heavy and chemical industry promotion planning group was a temporary group that
led the development of the industry. The secretary Oh was also the director of this
planning group, and the deputy director was a high-ranking secretary of the Blue
House. Other members were from relevant ministries (D. Choi, 1991, pp. 98-99). The
distance between the president and ministries became gradually larger, as the presidential
secretaries assumed a growing presence in the government, as shown in table 5.
Roles of Actors
Various kinds of actors could be engaged in making various decisions via these
multiple decision-making institutions. President Park made decisions especially at the
economic issues briefing meeting and the monthly enlarged meeting for export promo-
tion. Various actors such as not only bureaucrats, politicians, and experts of public
institutions, but also businessmen and journalists were invited to these meetings (D.
Choi, 1991, pp. 67-73).3
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Table 5. President Park’s Face-to-face Talks (%)
1964-1966 1967-1971 1972-1976 1977-1979
with bureaucrats of EPB 5.5% 4.7% 2.1% 1.6%
with bureaucrats of MCI 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 1.4%
with presidential secretaries 1.9% 14.3% 18.7% 48.2%
Source: H. Kim 2009.
3. The journalists served as communicators with the public. Regarding the importance of the
president’s presence and the roles of journalists for industrial policy, a former minister at
the time remarked that “if the president did not preside over the monthly economic issues
briefing meeting, how was the news about the meeting to be widely disseminated? The 
For example, 98 individuals were invited to the third meeting held in 1967: the
president, 18 ministers (including vice ministers), 17 directors and section-chiefs, six
heads of public institutions, eight experts of the business organizations or public enter-
prises, three professors, four executives from the legislative or judicial branch, 12 private
enterprise businessmen, and 29 regional representatives (11 bureaucrats, ten heads or
directors of the local government, and eight professors and one banker). Furthermore,
the monthly enlarged meeting for export promotion was reorganized and expanded to the
enlarged meeting for trade promotion in 1977, and about 200 individuals participated
in that meeting (S. Jang, 2006, pp. 75-76).
Due to the openness of the monthly enlarged meeting for export promotion, the actors
in the field had an opportunity to advance their opinions. For example, the institution-
alization of the general trading company was proposed by mission chiefs to Southeast
Asia in the fourth monthly enlarged meeting for export promotion of 1969, and they
proposed it again in the second meeting of 1973, and the tenth meeting of 1974. It was
institutionalized through discussion in the twelfth meeting of 1974, and the fourth and
fifth of 1975. Tax reductions, financial supports, funding supports, and so forth were
settled on in the following meetings (Lee, 2012; S. Jang, 2006, pp. 78-80).
Actors also sometimes competed in these decision-making forums. Ministers,
directors, and even section chiefs, who were in charge of making the briefing charts,
attended the briefing session and answered the president’s questions. If two ministries
had different opinions on an issue, representatives of both presented briefings in the
president’s presence. Representatives had vigorous debates, and the president made
the final decision after hearing both sides (Oh, 2006, pp. 11, 15). For instance, the
MCI objected to the EPB’s desire to fund the construction of the fertilizer plant by
inviting foreign capital. The two ministries clashed over the contract conditions of the
new fertilizer plant operation. After hearing both sides’ briefings, President Park accepted
the EPB’s request to guarantee more loans, which the country needed desperately at
the time (Oh, 1995, pp. 171-177).
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audience for it would be very small. But because the president presided over the meeting,
the press published many articles on it. The agenda of the presidential meeting became the
first priority; that is, the ministries were expected to concentrate their attention on the agenda
and to allocate resources for accomplishing it” (Suk-je Lee, cited in Kang et al., 2008, 137,
177).
Resource Mobilization
The government mobilized the material and the human resources of the state and
society to implement industrial policies. The government, especially in the 1960s, had
a great interest in mobilizing resources because in the wake of the Korean War and the
Japanese colonial era, Korea found itself without a structure of capital accumulation
(J. Kim, 2004). The government urged bureaucrats to push the work and stressed the
citizens’ spirit of self-help and diligence. The government tried to turn negative capital
into positive capital, acquire more foreign loans, and invite more foreign investments.
The rate of savings was so poor that the government was forced to depend on foreign
capital, as shown in table 6.
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Table 6. Korea’s Rate of Dependence Rate on Foreign Capital and the Amount of Foreign
Capital per Planning Period, 1962-1986
First Plan Second Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan Fifth Plan Total
(1962-1966) (1967-1971) (1972-1976) (1977-1981) (1982-1986)
total Investment ratio* 15.1 25.7 27.8 26.5 28.8 
(%) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
domestic rate of 6.1 15.7 18.0 25.9 28.7 
savings (%) (40.4) (61.1) (64.7) (97.7) (99.7)
overseas rate of 9.0 10.0 9.8 0.6 0.1 
savings (%) (59.6) (38.9) (35.3) (2.3) (0.3)
amount of foreign 
capital sought** 684 1,052 3,869 13,322 37,485 56,412
amount of foreign 
capital received*** 313 2,445 6,595 18,485 25,764 53,602
public loans (%) 116 811 2,416 5,751 6,691 15,785 (37.1) (33.2) (36.6) (31.1) (26.0) (29.4)
commercial loans**** 176 1,538 3,622 12,202 17,973 35.511 
(%) (56.2) (62.9) (54.9) (66.0) (69.8) (66.2)
foreign investments 21 96 557 532 1,100 2,306 
(%) (6.7) (3.9) (8.4) (2.9) (4.3) (4.3)
amount received/
amount sought 45 232 170 139 69 95
**** Total investment ratio and rate of savings represent the average for the period of the plans (EPB, 1991).
**** The amount of foreign capital sought was specified in the plans.
**** The figure used here for amount of foreign capital received is the arrival price.
**** Bank loans and bonds are included in the commercial loans.
Source: D. Choi 1991, p. 116.
Institutions
In the 1960s, institutions for resource mobilization began to be systemized. First,
organizations were created and aligned to improve mobilization capabilities. Within the
EPB, a section for public loans and a section for private loans under the International
Cooperation Bureau were established, as were a section for materials mobilization
planning and for fiscal and monetary affairs under the Budget Bureau. The EPB also
improved the mobilization capabilities of human resources by introducing a section
for technology promotion under the Technology Management Bureau. In addition, the
government established the National Tax Service in 1966 to collect more taxes.
These organizations executed measures to mobilize foreign capital. When foreign
aid began to rapidly decrease in the early 1960s as shown in figure 1, President 
Park ordered to create institutions to acquire more foreign capital in order to promote
industries (S. Choi, 2010a). The government reformed the Foreign Capital Introduction
Act in 1961 to modify the permissible range of foreign investments. In 1962, the
Guarantee Payment Act for Credit was enacted. The government guaranteed payments
of principal and interest for those businesses that were needed to realize the plans. Also,
trademark rights and patents of foreign businesses were to be strictly guarded (D.
Choi, 1991, pp. 112-114). The act helped create a welcome environment for foreign
investors.
The government itself likewise executed measures to mobilize domestic capital.
For example, the government carried out financial reforms that increased the interest
rates of fixed deposits from 15% to 30% in 1965. The result of that measure was that
total deposits from 1965 to 1969 increased 700%. The financial reform of 1965 is
often regarded as an instance of best practices according to neoclassical economic 
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Figure 1. Revenue Composition, 1948-1972
Source: 2010 budget summary.
theory. It has been used as evidence that economic growth in Korea was based on the
restoration of market functions. However, in reality, it expanded the scale of domestic
capital that was under the control of the government by bringing out capital from the
underground loan market (H. Jang, 1999).
The government also modified institutions so as to mobilize human resources. First,
the government aligned the bureaucracy by revising the National Public Service Act in
1963. It adopted a position classification system, strengthened the open competitive
examinations system, and guaranteed the status of public officials (D. Choi, 1991, pp.
124-131). In addition, the government increased the salary of public officials by 30%
in 1966, 23% in 1967, 30% in 1968, 30% in 1969, and 20% in 1970 over the previous
year (S. Lee, 1995, p. 232). Furthermore, the pension fund for public officials was also
increased. The total number of public officials, consequently, began to rise, as shown
in figure 2.
Professionals in various fields were also mobilized. Immediately after the coup,
civilian experts were hired from the government-run banks, and various technical
experts were recruited. For example, the three directors of the MCI were chosen from
among civilian experts with technical backgrounds and technicians, such as Won-chul
Oh, who was hired as section chief. Meanwhile, the government began developing a
long-term plan for human resources mobilization. The EPB announced the first science
and technology policies in 1962 and began systematically training technicians (Y. Kim
et al., 2010), establishing the Korea Institute of Science and Technology in 1966 and
the Korean Development Institute in 1971. Furthermore, about 100 technical high
schools, such as Kumoh Technical High School, were established. The graduates of
these schools usually became good workers in the heavy and chemical industries.
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Figure 2. Number of Public Officials, 1953-1972
Source: Bae and Eom 2012.
Roles of Actors
The military junta had tried to mobilize domestic capital by immediately executing
the Urgent Currency Reform Act. However, it failed and made foreign businessmen and
investors distrustful of the government at the initial stage of economic development. In
the wake of the implementation of measures designed to systematically train Koreans,
however, foreign private loans started flowing in. In 1964, private loans amounted to
only $13 million, but by 1969, they had increased to $411 million (Oh, 1996, p. 280).
The government distributed foreign private loans that bore a low interest rate to the
businessmen who planned to develop businesses that would help realize of the economic
plan. Businessmen learned that they could earn more money if their business was
selected by the Foreign Capital Introduction Council to be financed by foreign capital.
All businessmen sought to receive this financing even when they did not have a
detailed or concrete business plan. Eventually, the number of insolvent enterprises
increased. The regulatory provisions of the Foreign Capital Introduction Act were
strengthened in 1967 (D. Choi, 1991, pp. 115-116), and measures to restructure insolvent
enterprises were introduced in 1969. The Blue House took a lead role by establishing
an office under its administration specifically for handling the restructuring of insolvent
enterprises.
Meanwhile, businessmen who needed large-scale foreign capital went oversea to
get loans directly. For example, the CEO of Hyundai, Joo-young Jung, made every
effort to acquire loans to start a shipbuilding business, which was a core business of the
second plan of 1971. He negotiated with foreign investors and successfully arranged
the investment. At that time the government just backed his activities. Previously, the
state had built factories with foreign capital that was acquired diplomatically and then
transferred ownership of the factories to selected businessmen. In 1970s, the businessmen
started working independently with the support of the government. This shows that the
social sector was growing.
Instruments and Implementation
“The value of an economic plan cannot be found in the plan itself. Rather its
value depends on how much it can contribute to the economic growth of the
state by its realization. If a poor plan contributes to rapid economic growth by
being realized effectively, it is better than a good plan that has little possibility of
being realized (EPB, 1967, p. 122).”
As this excerpt from a document of the EPB suggests, the government was fully
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aware that policies had to be effectively implemented if it was to achieve its goals.
Drawing on the resources it had mobilized, the government sought to implement the
policies that had been made and revised in the multiple meetings. Industrial structure
policy was an attempt to enhance industrial structures. A representative example was
heavy and chemical industrialization. Specific industrial policies were intended to
revive stagnating industries or to foster strategic industries. Policies related to roads,
harbors, communication, electricity, housing, sanitation, environment, and labor were
included in industry-based policies. A combination of policies and mixed tools were
used to expand exports in the 1960s, and another combination and tools were used to
foster specific industries in the 1970s.
Institutions
Nonmonetary incentive tools and monetary incentive tools were embedded in insti-
tutions for industrial promotion. For example, in order to promote heavy and chemical
industrialization, monetary tools and nonmonetary tools were mixed together, as
shown in table 7.
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Table 7. Factors in the Promotion of the Industry Act
Machinery Shipbuilding Electronics Petrochemical Steel Nonferrous Textilesmetals
Regulations
entry regulations • • • • • • •
facility regulations
installation standards • •
approval of facility expansion • • •
incentives for constructing 
domestic production facilities • •
production regulations
regulations on importing raw 
materials • • •
production standards and 
investigations • • • • •
regulations on importing 
technology • •
Pricing Regulations • •
Reports and Investigations • • • • • • •
Rationalization of Industry
rationalization of industry 
plans • • • • •
Financial support and funding were usually used as monetary tools. First, President
Park offered financial support through the banks, which the military junta had nation-
alized after the military coup. The government-controlled financial system was com-
pleted with the revision of the Bank of Korea Act in 1962. The government sought to
effect industrial policies by distributing financial support to export businesses at a low
interest rate. Table 8 shows the difference between the standard interest rate and the
special interest rate.
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Table 8. Difference between the Standard and Special Interest Rates
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Return on Corporate Bonds 14.0 24.6 20.1 30.1 14.2 16.5
Interest rate on Private Loans 58.8 50.8 41.3 45.0 24.0 18.8
Export Financing 6.5 6.0 9.0 15.0 10.0 10.0
Facility Fund Rate 11.0 12.0 12.0 20.0 12.0 12.0
Source: B. Lee 1998, p. 46.
Machinery Shipbuilding Electronics Petrochemical Steel Nonferrous Textilesmetals
Research and Development
research and development 
assistance • • • • •
plan for collaboration on 
research and development •
Financial Support
special funds • • • • • •
financial support • • • • • •
assistance
direct assistance • •
discount on public utility 
charges • • • • •
Special Industrial Estates • • • •
Administrative Support
support of activities overseas • •
purchase of raw materials • •
Industry Associations • • • •
Source: B. Lee 1998.
Second, the government supported businesses through tax reductions and exemp-
tions. Tax reductions for foreign investors can be seen in table 9. The government also
executed fiscal policies of tax reduction and exemption for factories deployed in
industrial estates meeting entry regulations.
Policies were also made to strengthen exports and to regulate imports by connecting
them with the exchange rate policy. The exchange rate depreciated almost 100% per
year from 1961 to 1964. The foreign exchange deposit system was replaced with the
foreign exchange concentration system, which required exporters to deposit their
income in dollars in the central bank, in 1961. In addition, an incentive system was
formed for exports; the export and import link system was imposed in 1963, which
assigned import entitlement to exporters (H. Jang, 1999).
The government devised nonmonetary incentives as well. A representative example
was the establishment of the export day, which acknowledged the most successful
businesses as well as those of merit. In particular, the business that was rewarded was
promoted in the mass media and received tax reductions as well as an audit exemption.
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Table 9. Details of Tax Reduction for Foreign Investors
Type of tax Tax Rates Details of Tax Reduction
– tax exemption for five years
income tax 8-70% – 50% tax reduction for three years after expiration 
of initial five-year period of tax exemption
tax on earned 8-70% tax exemption for five years
income (foreign income)
– publicly held 
companies, 20-27%, – tax exemption for five years
corporate tax 25-33% – 50% tax reduction for three years after expiration 
– privately held of initial five-year period of tax exemption
companies, 20-40%
special 10-100% on 20 items tax exemption on capital goods
consumption tax
– land, 0.3-5% – tax exemption for five years
property tax – houses and ships, – 50% tax reduction for three years after expiration 
0.3-5% of initial five-year period of tax exemption
– province, city, and – tax exemption for five years
acquisition tax borough, 10% – 50% tax reduction for three years after expiration 
– Seoul and Pusan, of initial five-year period of tax exemption
20%
Source: D. Choi 1991, p. 114.
The recipient of the reward was not limited to representatives from export businesses
either, as engineers were eligible if they contributed to improving the productivity of
exports by developing a new method of production or a new exported good (Kang et
al., 2008, pp. 206-209).
In addition to incentives, regulations used to monitor and assign responsibilities
were also designed. For example, the role of the ‘export responsibility system’ was
important in increasing exports in the early days of Korea’s economic development
(C. Park, 1958). The export responsibility system was managed by assigning export
responsibilities for an established total amount to exporters through export plans.
However, since 1963, there has been an administrative order requiring exporters to
report what they plan to export every month and what they in fact end up exporting
each month. Anyone who failed to submit this report was excluded from the support
system for export promotion and penalized. As seen in figure 3, although the quantity
of exports seems as though it was determined by reports from private traders and the
government’s export enhancement plan, in fact at this time exporters had to export the
number of items the government specified (Kang et al., 2008, pp. 166-167). Nevertheless,
the government had to resolve the difficulties exporters confronted when they failed to
meet the target (Ha, 2006, p. 197), and business leaders’ needs were satisfied during
the process. Thus, the export target policy provided a means for sharing goals, results,
and responsibilities between the government and businesses, outside of regulations.
Roles of Actors
President Park authorized the implementation of decisions regarding industrial 
policy. Especially in the 1970s, he encouraged exporters, even using the term, “export
war.” And various organizations were established to ensure communication, coopera-
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Figure 3. Setting Export Target Figures
Source: Adapted from D. Choi 1991, p. 111.
tion, and the sharing of information between the government and business enterprises,
such as industrial associations. The government required all enterprises to join the
industrial associations, which were founded either on the initiative of the industry
itself or with the encouragement of the government (Fields, 1997, p. 135). Some of the
associations predated the coup, such as the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
the Korean Trade Association, and the Spinning and Weaving Association of Korea.
From the end of the 1960s through the 1970s, new industrial associations representing
each field were founded, including the Korea Association of Machinery Industry, as
the government focused on the strategic industries. These associations were used by the
government as a means to effectively control and guide a particular field or company
(Hart-Lansberg, 1993, p. 51). And the associations contributed to ensuring the flow of
information between the government and the enterprises and helped coordinate the
activities of the enterprises through the official council, acting as an intermediary
between the MCI and individual businesses (Root, 1996, p. 26).
There were also frontline organizations that led exports, standing in for the govern-
ment in the field, such as the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency, which the
government founded in 1962. The agency conducted foreign market research and
helped enterprises to find trade deals. The government also came to see itself as a
“general trading company” that had played a critical role in transforming Japan into a
powerful export nation. Thus, the government institutionalized the general trading
companies (Y. Park, 2008), which acted as frontline organizations of “Korea, Inc.”
Moreover, the government supported enterprises by establishing public enterprises to
build and manage industry infrastructures.
Feedback
One of the primary characteristics of industrial policies in Korea was the active
feedback provided by both government-run organizations and the business enterprises.4
As main enactors of the industrial policy, the enterprises presented summaries of market
information and problems to the government. The executive branches of the government-
run organizations circulated information regarding problems and the outlined possible
solutions. The government-run banks, the public institutes, and the Korea Trade
Investment Promotion Agency circulated both market information and new ideas. This
feedback was typically provided in forums such as the economic issues briefing meeting
and the enlarged meeting for trade promotion.
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4. This section is mostly based on S. Kim 2000.
Institutions
The economic issues briefing meeting and the enlarged meeting for trade promotion
were introduced around the same time, in 1964 and 1965, which was when economic
growth kicked into high gear, and at these meetings, participants regularly evaluated
and examined the economic situation and export status (Kang et al., 2008, p. 252). The
following excerpt from the minutes of a 1968 enlarged meeting for trade promotion
suggests that analyses of the performance record and difficulties exporters faced were
carried out, that solutions were sought, and that reports on the results of export activity
were reported.
“At the sixth enlarged meeting for trade promotion, on July 1, the participants
analyzed export performance up to the end of May and discussed how to promote
exports. . . . Meanwhile, the president ordered the promotion of foreign currency
savings and policies on sound consumption on a continual basis, so as to avoid a
radical import inhibition with a consideration of the impact on prices. Giving a
brief outline of the results of suggestions at the fifth meeting, participants reported
that they have eased the exclusive export right system as a way of overcoming
sluggish exports to Sweden. . . . For the rest, they analyzed export performance
over the past month, classified by main items exported, the regions they were
exported from, and their industry (S. Jang, 2006, p. 166).”
Institutions were also aligned so that businessmen could advance the suggestions in
the economic issues briefing meeting and the enlarged meeting for trade promotion.
For example, the emergency order regarding economic growth and stabilization was
an action suggested by businessmen. The Federation of Korean Industries officially
suggested an interest rate cut in January 1972, and two businessmen who were invited
to the enlarged meeting for trade promotion proposed in person that the rate should be
lowered. In response to this, the loan freeze was launched as an emergency act in
August (Kang et al., 2008, pp. 126-131).
Active feedback was likewise provided during the intermediate level of meetings
between the government and the enterprises. The meetings were in the form of a round
table and council, and they were either comprehensive or partial. The comprehensive
meetings were working-level export promotion meetings, with the assistant secretary of
the MCI serving as the chairman. The partial meetings were working-level departmental
meetings, classified according to six aspects: planning, agriculture and forestry, marine
industry, mining industry, and light and heavy industry (Korea Trade Investment 
Promotion Agency, 1992, p. 68).
In addition, before and after the enlarged meeting for trade promotion, regular
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export promotion meetings, regional export meetings, and other departmental meetings
to discuss particular export items were held. The regular export promotion meeting
built close cooperation systems between the government and the enterprises. The
departmental meetings were held frequently to analyze the reasons for weak export
items and develop countermeasures. The regional export promotion meetings were held
when the regular export promotion meetings required them. These meetings fostered
cooperation between the government and the enterprises by making recommendations
to the government after considering problems and difficulties and by sharing the
results of the enlarged meeting for trade promotion (Korea Trade Investment Promotion
Agency, 1992, pp. 171, 153).
Roles of Actors
The government and the businessmen exchanged information through the various
institutions we have described aformentioned. For businessmen, these institutions 
provided opportunities for solving problems, and for the government, they were channels
for gathering information and managing export goals (Fields, 1997, p. 139). The MCI
gathered information from the individual export companies on a weekly and monthly
basis and monitored and analyzed changes in market conditions. Using the feedback
process, the government updated export items and policies as needed, enabling both
itself and the enterprises to react quickly to a rapidly changing world market (Camposs
& Root, 1996, p. 90).
The CEO of Hyundai, Joo-young Jung, who served as the chairman of the Federa-
tion of Korean Industries, mentioned that the government tended to consult with large
companies before making final decision on economic policies (Sisa Journal, May 7,
1992). Indeed, 70% of the economic policies recommended by Federation of Korean
Industries were adopted by the government (Bae, 1983, p. 294). Bureaucrats and the
businessmen also maintained an unofficial channel that allowed feedback. They
worked together, forming unofficial consultative groups and exchanging information
through irregular and unofficial meetings in private places.5
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5. The following testimonies from former officials of MCI depict how information pertaining to
industrial policy was exchanged through irregular and unofficial meetings of public officials
and businessmen in private places. Mr. C., a former official of MCI stated, “I was not able
to make a yearly supply and demand program. So, a public corporation had sent an
employee, and we worked together all night, in the inn. . . . I could not have completed the
task without him.” Mr. O., a former official of MCI commented that “the businessmen 
CONCLUSION
According to the results of our analysis, the governance system of industrial policy
in Korea during the era of its economic growth is closest to the étatiste model. The
Korean state was a principal actor that exerted state power as a means of promoting
industry and economic development. In each stage of the governance process, the 
government established effective and efficient state institutions that not only enhanced
the industrial policy capacity of the government but also created an environment that
permitted various stakeholders in business and related academia and research were
able to participate.
President Park’s strong determination and his commitment to industrial promotion
compelled high-level government officials undertake significant steps in support of
industrial policy. Bureaucrats and businessmen maintained formal and informal channels
that allowed information and knowledge related to industrial policy to circulate, and this
circulation of information and knowledge was reflected in industrial policy programs.
Various kinds of private actors, including professors, researchers in think tanks, busi-
nessmen, and staffs of industrial associations, were mobilized and participated in the
governance process.
These governance mechanisms produced good outcomes in terms of cohesiveness,
adaptability, and accountability, at least with respect to the outcomes of industrial policy.
Cohesiveness was high owing to the bonding among the various actors of multilevel
institutions who participated in elaborating industrial policy and were given opportunities
to strengthen the link between actors and organizations and programs at each stage in
the process. Adaptability was enhanced. Policy decisions could be quickly made under
such kinds of institutional arrangements. Moreover, quick feedback from the market
and businesses contributed to facilitating the operation of error correction systems. That
is to say, quick feedback made it possible to fix small errors and policy weaknesses
before a large-scale policy failure occurred. Accountability was also enhanced in this
system. The meetings presided over by the president made high-ranking officials more
accountable to policy results and more sensitive to their performance.
However, this étatiste model of governance system for industrial policy worked at
the expense of democratization (Pierre & Peters, 2005, p. 17). For example, under the
1972 Yushin Constitution, human rights and political freedoms were subject to restric-
tion in the name of economic development and national security. The dominance of
state in the field of industrial policy invited the abuse of government power, corruption
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came to my office with information. But that was not enough. So, people like us used to
meet at coffee shops before going to work in the morning” (Ha, 2006, 143-144).
of public officials, and favoritism in industrial policy. The state exerted its power to
put firms and companies out of business by shutting off their access to credit unless
they followed the government’s policy. There were rampant suspicions and rumors
about inappropriate relationships between big businesses (chabols) and the political
leadership. In turn, these suspicion and rumors led to debates over the injustice and
unfairness of Korean society and the political and social costs of rapid industrial
growth. This governance system was also problematic in terms of inclusiveness
because the representatives in the fields of labor and agriculture were not allowed to
participate in the process of governance (Jung, 2014, pp. 206-207; Ko, 2008; J. Choi,
2002).
What are the theoretical and practical implications of the results of this study? First,
it should be emphasized that the state and society worked together in formulating and
implementing industrial policy. Businessmen and experts from private economic orga-
nizations who participated in industrial policy making, in turn, became one of the major
sources of information for public agencies and the driving forces behind industrial
promotion, helping to strengthen public institutions for industrial policy. Second, the
importance of institutional innovations for industrial promotion, such as the five-year
plan system for economic development, pan-governmental meetings presided over by
the president, both incentive-based and non-incentive-based industrial policy instru-
ments, and ‘winner-picking systems’ that promoted competition between the businesses,
should be stressed. These innovations not only were instrumental in stimulating
changes but also complemented the weakness of the étatiste model of industrial policy
governance in Korea.
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